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SUMMARY: Global marine fisheries production has reached a maximum and may even be declining. Underlying this trend 
is a well-understood sequence of development, overexploitation, depletion and in some instances collapse of individual fish 
stocks, a pattern that can sequentially link geographically distant populations. Ineffective governance, economic considerations 
and climate impacts are often responsible for this sequence, although the relative contribution of each factor is contentious. In 
this paper we use a global bioeconomic model to explore the synergistic effects of climate variability, economic pressures and 
management measures in causing or avoiding this sequence. The model shows how a combination of climate-induced variability 
in the underlying fish population production, particular patterns of demand for fish products and inadequate management 
is capable of driving the world’s fisheries into development, overexploitation, collapse and recovery phases consistent with 
observations. Furthermore, it demonstrates how a sequential pattern of overexploitation can emerge as an endogenous property 
of the interaction between regional environmental fluctuations and a globalized trade system. This situation is avoidable through 
adaptive management measures that ensure the sustainability of regional production systems in the face of increasing global 
environmental change and markets. It is concluded that global management measures are needed to ensure that global food 
supply from marine products is optimized while protecting long-term ecosystem services across the world’s oceans. 
Keywords: fisheries modelling, sequential exploitation, economic globalization, climate change, fisheries management.
RESUMEN: Modelización de la explotación sucesiva y posible colapso de las pesquerías marinas por medio 
de la globalización económica, cambio climático y alternativas de gestión. – La producción pesquera mundial 
ha superado su máximo potencial y parece estar en declive. Esta tendencia es el resultado de una sucesión de desarrollo, 
sobreexplotación, agotamiento, y en algunos casos, colapso de los stocks pesqueros individuales. Este proceso conecta 
recursos distantes a nivel geográfico. Esta secuencia es a menudo atribuida al efecto combinado de una gestión deficiente, 
consideraciones económicas y efectos ambientales pero la influencia de cada uno de estos factores suele ser difícil de 
determinar. En el presente trabajo hemos utilizado un modelo bioeconómico global para explorar los efectos conjuntos de la 
variabilidad climática, presiones económicas y medidas de gestión para producir o evitar esta secuencia. El modelo muestra 
como una combinación de variabilidad de origen climático en los stocks, el aumento de la demanda de productos marinos 
y una gestión deficiente es capaz de dirigir las pesquerías mundiales a través de un proceso de desarrollo, sobreexplotación, 
colapso y recuperación similar a los patrones observados. Además, mostramos cómo el patrón secuencial de sobreexplotación 
puede emerger como una propiedad endógena de la interacción entre fluctuaciones regionales y un mercado globalizado. Esta 
situación es evitable con una gestión adaptativa de los recursos que asegure la sostenibilidad de los sistemas de producción 
regionales en un contexto de cambio y mercados globales. Se concluye con que una gestión global de los recursos es 
necesaria para garantizar la óptima producción de productos de origen marino y la conservación de los ecosistemas.
Palabras clave: modelización de pesquerías, explotación secuencial, globalización económica, cambio climático, gestión 
de pesquerías.
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INTRODUCTION
The world’s fisheries have reached and possibly ex-
ceeded their maximum sustainable production poten-
tial. Despite increasing fishing effort and technological 
capacity, global catches have stagnated over the last 2 
decades, and may decline if the current rates of exploi-
tation are not reduced (Watson and Pauly, 2001; Pauly 
et al., 2002; Zeller and Pauly, 2005; FAO, 2007; World 
Bank, 2008). Historical data also indicate that while 
production in developed countries has declined in the 
last 35 years, it has increased in developing countries 
over the same period (Delgado et al., 2003).
Several authors have recently argued that the de-
velopment, growth, overexploitation and collapse that 
have characterized many natural resources since the 
1950s follow a sequential geographical pattern (Oren-
sanz et al., 1998; Kirby, 2004; Watson et al., 2004; 
Berkes et al., 2006; FAO, 2007; World Bank, 2008; 
Sethi et al., 2010). Berkes et al. (2006) summarized 
that these sequential patterns can deplete stocks faster 
than regulatory agencies are able to respond to, a proc-
ess that could only be put right through global institu-
tions with broad authority and conservation incentives. 
Sequential overexploitation patterns can be explained 
by a combination of 3 major processes: increasing 
demand in a globalized market, climate effects and 
ineffective management. Additionally, overcapacity of 
the fishing fleets and improved technology have con-
tributed to the unsustainable harvest of fish stocks.
The increasing global demand for marine products 
caused by both population growth and higher rates of 
per capita consumption (Delgado et al., 2003), com-
bined with constant or reduced catches (FAO, 2007), has 
increased the value of marine commodities, provided 
new market opportunities, and thus encouraged further 
fishing pressure (Delgado et al., 2003; Pinnegar et al., 
2006; Sumaila et al., 2007). Geographically distant pro-
duction systems can pick up global demand thanks to 
the opportunities provided by economic globalization 
(O’Brien and Leichenko, 2000; Merino et al., 2010a). 
Thus, global forces can impose additional pressures on 
resources initially exploited for local consumption. 
In addition, climate has emerged as an important 
issue for fisheries by affecting processes at the bottom 
of the food web (Brander, 2007; Barange and Perry, 
2009; Cheung et al., 2009). Climate-driven inter-an-
nual, decadal and inter-decadal fluctuations in regional 
fish stocks resonate in international commodity mar-
kets where prices react to supply variability (Chavez 
et al., 2003; Arnason, 2006; Behrenfeld et al., 2006; 
Merino et al., 2010a, b).
Finally, inefficient management can amplify the ef-
fects of climate-driven fluctuations (Anderson et al., 
2008) and is considered responsible for the economic 
inefficiency, and poor stewardship of global fisher-
ies (World Bank, 2008). While adaptive management 
systems (Hoggarth et al., 2006; FAO, 2007) are being 
developed to avoid the overexploitation of fish stocks, 
and are advocated to ensure the recovery of those al-
ready overexploited (Worm et al., 2009), effective 
adaptive management is still an exception to the global 
norm (Mora et al., 2009).
Here we build a global network model to demon-
strate how economic globalization, climate impacts, 
and inefficient fisheries management systems interact to 
drive geographically distant fisheries through the proc-
ess of sequential development, growth, overexploitation 
and collapse. The simulated global system is charac-
terized by 10 theoretical, geographically distant and 
identical regional fisheries production systems which 
converge in a globalized market and are subject to en-
vironmental fluctuations. Each fishery is represented by 
its own characteristic fishing production system with 
the goal of maximizing its short term economic return 
(Lleonart and Merino, 2010). Competent authorities set 
maximum allowed catches based on maximum sustain-
able yield management principles (Schaefer, 1954; Seijo 
et al., 1998). Two ways of achieving this objective are 
contrasted: the first does not consider environmentally 
driven fluctuations effects on fish stocks, while the sec-
ond does with a perfect knowledge of the system. In the 
first, managers underestimate the potential negative en-
vironmental effects and aim to maintain high sustainable 
catch rates. In the second, fleets and authorities adap-
tively respond to fluctuations to reach maximum sus-
tainable yield (MSY) targets. The price for the resultant 
fish products in the international market is the result of 
the global production, the so-called “market externality” 
(Oakerson, 1992; Merino et al., 2007), thus driven by 
both global demand and supply of the marine commod-
ity. Alternative management principles are implemented 
in the simulations to investigate the ability of efficient 
adaptive systems to avert or slow down the sequential 
principles of geographical overexploitation.
The work aims to understand the synergies between 
global market and climate drivers in amplifying fluc-
tuations in the production and exploitation patterns of 
marine commodities, how these synergies can trigger 
sequential overexploitation and collapse patterns, and 
how adaptive management can be used to sustain the 
underlying resources. The main novelty of this model-
ling work is that fisheries are described as a global issue 
in which the fate of distant resources is interconnected.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The bioeconomic network model used is inspired 
by patterns of global fisheries production systems. The 
network is composed of 2 layers. The first layer includes 
N production systems composed of their fish stocks and 
fishing fleets. Each of the i = 1, 2 … N fish stocks are 
characterized by a logistic growth and a harvest rate 
(Schaefer 1954). The harvest rate is driven by fleet ac-
tivity dynamics, considered here to follow a short-term 
economic maximization strategy (Lleonart and Merino, 
2010). Fleets and human capital involved in fisheries 
operations are not fixed, but producers are only able to 
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modulate their fishing effort to a certain extent (Clark et 
al., 2005). The model imposes that producers can vary 
their yearly fishing effort to be between 70 and 130% of 
the previous year. The simulation model assumes that 
managers’ knowledge of the system is complete in rela-
tion to the periodic state of their regional fish stocks and 
their cost of fishing, and delayed in relation to the mar-
ket price they will get for their product. Producers will 
modulate their fishing effort so that they will maximize 
their economic profits at each time interval. To do so, 
they will account for the expected revenues from selling 
their product and their fishing cost, which in this model 
are limited to a proportionality function to the distance 
between the stock and the globalized market (production 
and consumption). The equations that describe produc-
tion system dynamics are as follows:
Biomass dynamics are driven by logistic growth 
and harvest of each of the i stocks (Eq. 1), where r is 
the intrinsic growth rate, K is the carrying capacity pa-
rameter or pristine biomass, defined as that reached by 
the fish stock in the absence of fishing, B is the stock 
biomass and Y is the catch: 
	 ∂Bi / ∂t = r Bi,t (1 – Bi,t / Ki) – Yi,t (1)
We approximate the discrete time interval solution 
and introduce a normally distributed climate variabil-
ity factor in the stocks biological production (Eq. 2), 
where the mean of the normal distribution is μ and the 
standard deviation	σ:
Bi,t+1 = Bi,t + r Bi,t (1 – Bi,t / Ki) N (μ = 1, σ = 0.25)	– Yi,t (2)
Yield (Y) is the product of the fishing mortality (F) 
and the available stock biomass. Fishing mortality is 
composed of the catchability coefficient (q), or fish-
ing mortality produced by a unit of fishing effort, and 
fishing effort itself (E) (Eq. 3). The producers’ yearly 
effort strategy aims to maximize their profits (p) in that 
fishing period. To do so, revenues and cost of fishing 
will be calculated, based on the price (p) of fish at in-
ternational markets and the cost (c) per unit of effort. 
As can be deduced, the cost of a harvest unit will de-
pend upon the fish stock level, i.e. scarce resources are 
more expensive to exploit than abundant ones. 
 Yi,t = Fi Bi,t = qiEi,t Bi,t (3)
	 pi,t = pt Yi,t – ciEi,t (4)
Note that the price-to-cost ratio will be a key vari-
able for analyzing fisheries development. The fishing 
effort that producers will choose will be that which 
maximizes their profits with the following malleability 
limitation: the following condition will be satisfied if a 
30% variation on the previous year’s effort is allowed: 
p	(Ei,t)≥p	(E*i,t) for any
 E*i,t = [0.7Ei,t–1,..., Ei,t–1,..., 1.3Ei,t–1] (5)
Regional producers’ strategies will be limited by 
management policies too. Producers’ catch will be 
modulated by 2 alternative measures. Initially, yield is 
limited through management by the estimated MSY. 
For the Schaefer model assumed here, MSY is defined 
as ri/2qi (Seijo et al., 1998), which would prevent stock 
biomass from falling below 50% Ki=BMSY in a stable en-
vironment. As a consequence, this management system 
does not consider the potential negative effects of envi-
ronmental fluctuations on fish stocks. Another way of 
seeing it is that managers tend to underestimate the prob-
ability of a negative environmental event occurring and 
thus assume a mostly optimistic view of the uncertainty 
about fish stocks’ response to fishing and climate. Fur-
thermore, it mimics the aim of fishing at high rates at any 
time. Alternatively, adaptive management is imposed on 
to yearly catch limits so that fish stocks will reach their 
BMSY levels the following year. This management system 
assumes that the periodic knowledge on the state of the 
exploited stock is complete, and no uncertainty is thus 
considered. As we will discuss in the last section of the 
manuscript, none of the above management scenarios 
fully reflects the real decision-making process in fisher-
ies management but they are useful for understanding 
global fisheries trends.
Catch limits (Y+) imposed by adaptive management 
are estimated by:
Yt+ = Bi,t – (Ki / 2) + ri Bi,t (1 – Bi,t / Ki) (6)
If exploiters’ effort decisions involve fishing be-
yond their limits, their effort is automatically driven to 
levels that will produce the permitted maximum catch. 
The second layer of the network is the globalized 
market. Trade occurs when market equilibrium con-
ditions are reached (Nagurney, 1993; Mullon et al., 
2009), which means that the price consumers are will-
ing to pay for the marine commodity meets the price 
producers ask to produce the demanded quantity of 
commodity. For a constant supply, if the quantity of 
product demanded increases, its price will increase 
and, for a constant demand, the price will increase if 
the quantity supplied declines. We formulate this equi-
librium with a linear price:
 pt = αt – β ∑
i=1
I  
Yi (7)
where α is the maximum price that consumers would 
pay for the last unit of the marine commodity and β is 
the price flexibility which reflects how the price will 
react to fluctuations in the supply for a given level of 
demand, driven by the dynamics of α. Demand has 
been imposed to grow exponentially in time following:
	 αt+1 = αt + γ	t (8)
where γt is the time-dependent annual increase in de-
mand. Equation 7 allows the market externality to be 
modelled (Oakerson, 1992). The price that producers 
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expect to obtain for their product depends not only on 
their production but on the production of other produc-
ers too. Moreover, a decline in the supply of a distant 
production system will increase the economic opportu-
nity for other producers.
The above equations allow us to investigate through 
simulation how market and climate dynamics interact 
and amplify their individual signals. It also allows rec-
ommendations to be made on the basis of the 2 alterna-
tive management scenarios considered. The simulation 
seeks to understand how global fisheries have been 
driven through 6 different phases of development (pre-
development, growth, full exploitation, overexploita-
tion and recovery or collapse) in recent decades, when 
strong socioeconomic changes have impacted fisheries 
simultaneously with multi-scaled temporal environ-
mental fluctuations (Delgado et al., 2003; FAO, 2007; 
Barange and Perry, 2009). 
In order to make the model tractable, the numeri-
cal parameterization of the network is based on some 
simplifying assumptions. First, the 10 stocks consid-
ered are identical in biological terms, i.e. their intrin-
sic growth rates and carrying capacities are the same. 
Moreover, the fishing fleets’ technical capacities are 
also identical, so they all have the same catchability 
coefficient. Differences among fish stocks are uniquely 
related to their distance from the global market (Fig. 1), 
which determines fishing cost. The parameters used in 
the numerical simulations are shown in Table 1.
RESULTS
The bioeconomic network model is used to ex-
plain the different phases that interconnected fisheries 
go through. In the first simulation (Fig. 2) the only 
economic driver reflects historical increases in de-
mand for marine commodities, but without fluctuat-
ing resources. Fishing starts because there is a market 
demanding marine commodities. In the following 
years, under this simplistic simulation global demand 
does not perturb the price-to-cost ratio of each pro-
duction system. As the cost of fishing is proportional 
to the stock’s distance from a single global market, 
if the price of the marine commodity increases at a 
constant rate, single exploiters start fishing when a 
certain price-to-cost ratio is reached (Fig. 2). Note 
that the same pattern would have been obtained if 
instead of increasing price for marine commodities 
we had modelled a constantly decreasing fishing 
cost. The price–to-cost ratio expansion drives each 
fishery through pre-development, growth and full 
exploitation phases. In the model fisheries are regu-
lated through equilibrium MSY limits. As a certain 
human and technical capital, activity or fishing effort 
is reached, the producer’s strategies will be limited 
so that the estimated MSY is not exceeded and the 
fishing effort remains at levels that maximize eco-
system productivity. Under the MSY regulation and 
after a certain critical price-to-cost ratio is reached, 
the global fisheries production is maximized because 
all the individual fisheries remain at full exploitation 
or MSY levels. 
In the second simulation (Fig. 3) we introduce 
fluctuations in market conditions. Price dynamics 
are now not just driven by a constant demand but, 
at certain levels, the increase in fisheries production 
slows down the price-to-cost ratio, so fleet activity 
fluctuates according to demand, and so does yield. 
Thus, price dynamics are the cause of the observed 
variability. However, after the critical price-to-cost 
ratio has been exceeded, demand drives the fisheries 
Fig. 1. – Model framework. The N regional fish stocks (Si) have 
identical productivity, and the only significant difference among 
them is their distance from the globalized market. This distance is 
translated into larger fishing cost for resources located furthest away 
from the market. 
Table 1. – Model parameter values. While they are scaled to real 
examples, they do not fit to any particular fishery. Biological param-
eters are r (intrinsic growth rate), K (carrying capacity), q (catch-
ability coefficient). Environmental fluctuations are normally distrib-
uted (μ = mean and σ = standard deviation). Economic parameters 
are c (cost of fishing), α0 (maximum price of the marine commodity 
at t = 0), β (flexibility of price to changes in supply) and γ (yearly 
increase in demand for marine commodity).  
 r K q c μ σ
Production 1 106 5×10-4 i=1: 1 1 0, 0.25
Systems    i=2: 600
    2<i<10: 250 + ci-1
 α0  β  γ
Global market 1  0, 5×10-5  0.01
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exploitation phases. After this critical price-to-cost 
ratio is exceeded, global fisheries follow the same 
patterns as those observed in Figure 2. Stocks never 
fall below BMSY=(K/2) and world fisheries reach their 
maximum production capacity before the 100th year 
of the simulations and remain at the full exploitation 
phase thereafter. In both simulations shown until this 
point, the ecosystem’s potential is optimized as all 10 
stocks are fully exploited.
The third simulation investigates how climate per-
turbations can destabilize the global network when 
occurring simultaneously with demand expansion. A 
first look at Figure 4 suggests instability and collapse 
of global fisheries. The initial years of the simulation 
show a similar pattern to that in Figure 3. However, fol-
lowing the sequential exploitation of stocks until phase 
III, they seem to become vulnerable to climate fluctua-
tions. Approximately at a time when the price-to-cost 
Fig. 2. – Dynamics of the global fisheries over a 150-year simulation, driven solely by an increase in the demand for marine commodities, 
and managed according to MSY criteria. A) Price of the marine commodity as a function of its production cost (thick line), representing the 
change in demand (averaged for the 10 fisheries). The fishing effort applied by regional fisheries in their fish stocks in relation to the effort that 
would produce maximum sustainable catches is shown in thinner grey shades. Dotted line represents the effort that would produce maximum 
sustainable catches. B) Regional fisheries catch in relation to their MSY values over 150 years. MSY is indicated by a dotted line. C) Available 
biomass in the regional stocks, in relation to their pristine levels, and indication of the exploitation phases for each stock (I, Pre-development; 
II, Growth; III, Full exploitation; IV, Overexploitation; V, Collapse; VI, Recovery). Grey region indicates MSY obtained when the available 
biomass is nearly 50% of the carrying capacity. Note that the MSY regulation under conditions of biological equilibrium prevents stocks from 
reaching overexploitation. D) Global fisheries production in 150 years, in relation to their potential maximum, which is achieved when the 10 
fisheries are fully exploited. The maximum global production is thus related to the maximum potential productivity of marine ecosystems in 
stable conditions.
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ratio doubles, the system is dominated by demand, re-
sulting in a sequential development and growth of the 
global fisheries. It is at the time when stocks reach their 
full exploitation phase that negative or unfavourable 
climatic perturbations make single stocks fall below 
BMSY levels. As this occurs when the price and cost ratio 
is beyond a critical level, producers are economically 
motivated to reach their assigned catch limits. They do 
so by investing in fishing effort, which increases to 5 
times the level that would be consistent with ecosys-
tem productivity or EMSY (dotted line in Figure 4A). 
The catch limits are set again by MSY equilibrium 
estimations and they are fulfilled by removing a larger 
fraction of the available biomass, below BMSY due to 
the unfavourable climatic perturbations. When this 
happens, i.e. when a negative climatic perturbation 
impacts a fully exploited stock in synergy with certain 
demand values, a single stock is driven into the overex-
Fig. 3. – Dynamics of the global fisheries over a 150-year simulation, driven by an increase in the demand for marine commodities and 
market equilibrium, and managed according to MSY criteria. A) Price of the marine commodity as a function of its production cost (thick 
line), representing the change in demand (averaged for the 10 fisheries). The fishing effort applied by regional fisheries in their fish stocks in 
relation to the effort that would produce maximum sustainable catches is shown in thinner grey shades. Dotted line represents the effort that 
would produce maximum sustainable catches. B) Regional fisheries catch in relation to their MSY values over 150 years. MSY is indicated 
by a dotted line. C) Available biomass in the regional stocks, in relation to their pristine levels, and indication of the exploitation phases for 
each stock (I, Pre-development; II, Growth; III, Full exploitation; IV, Overexploitation; V, Collapse; VI, Recovery). Grey region indicates 
maximum sustainable yield obtained when the available biomass is nearly 50% of the carrying capacity. Note that the MSY regulation under 
conditions of biological equilibrium prevents stocks from reaching overexploitation. D) Global fisheries production in 150 years, in relation 
to their potential maximum, which is achieved when the 10 fisheries are fully exploited. The maximum global production is thus related to the 
maximum potential productivity of marine ecosystems in stable conditions.
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ploitation phase. Recovering a stock from overexploi-
tation and avoiding collapse would imply fishing less 
than the estimated MSY but once an overexploitation 
phase has been entered and there is enough economic 
incentive to fulfil MSY catch limits, the stocks will be 
driven to collapse. When this happens, even the high 
price of the product is not enough to make fleet activity 
profitable and effort is subsequently reduced. Stocks 
are then allowed to enter a recovery phase until the ex-
ploitation becomes profitable again, when the process 
starts again. In this case, regional shifts in ecosystems 
could be triggered not only because of climatic factors 
(Chavez et al., 2003) but also because of fishing activ-
ity (Anderson et al., 2008). Figure 4D shows that the 
sequential overexploitation and collapse of the closest 
fisheries (those with the lowest transport cost) occurs 
before the development and growth of the farthest 
ones. The development of the more distant resources 
might disguise the negative effects of overexploita-
tion and collapse of the depleted stocks and give the 
Fig. 4. – Dynamics of the global fisheries over a 150-year simulation, driven by an increase in the demand for marine commodities, market 
equilibrium and environmental (production) fluctuations, and managed according to MSY criteria. A) Price of the marine commodity as a 
function of its production cost (thick line), representing the change in demand (averaged for the 10 fisheries). The fishing effort applied by 
regional fisheries in their fish stocks in relation to the effort that would produce maximum sustainable catches is shown in thinner grey shades. 
Dotted line represents the effort that would produce maximum sustainable catches. B) Regional fisheries catch in relation to their MSY values 
over 150 years. MSY is indicated by a dotted line. C) Available biomass in the regional stocks, in relation to their pristine levels, and indica-
tion of the exploitation phases for each stock (I, Pre-development; II, Growth; III, Full exploitation; IV, Overexploitation; V, Collapse; VI, 
Recovery). Grey region indicates maximum sustainable yield obtained when the available biomass is nearly 50% of the carrying capacity. D) 
Global fisheries production in 150 years in relation to their potential maximum, which is achieved when the 10 fisheries are fully exploited. 
The maximum global production is thus related to the maximum potential productivity of marine ecosystems in stable conditions.
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impression that a constant high catch is sustainable. 
Any negative trend in global supplies is thus smoothed 
by the development of new fisheries and a relatively 
apparent stable global production is maintained over 
2 decades (years 75-95 in the simulation), before the 
sequential collapse becomes obvious at a global scale. 
It must be noted that each fishery’s collapse imposes an 
additional pressure on other stocks through the market 
equilibrium condition. When the global supply declines 
due to the collapse of a fishery, a well-established glo-
balized economic system allows consumer demand to 
shift between production systems. As a consequence, 
the economic incentive to fish is accelerated in the last 
years for those distant producers (Fig. 4A, solid line). 
Note that MSY catch limits have never been exceeded 
in this simulation, and that the sequence of overex-
ploitation and collapse does not necessarily follow the 
same sequence of full development. What triggers the 
collapse is the negative climatic signal, which is set 
through a normal distribution when it happened at the 
Fig. 5. – Dynamics of the global fisheries over a 150-year simulation, driven by an increase in the demand for marine commodities, market 
equilibrium and environmental (production) fluctuations, and managed adaptatively to drive stocks to BMSY levels. A) Price of the marine 
commodity as a function of its production cost (thick line), representing the change in demand (averaged for the 10 fisheries). The fishing 
effort applied by regional fisheries in their fish stocks in relation to the effort that would produce maximum sustainable catches is shown in 
thinner grey shades. Dotted line represents the effort that would produce maximum sustainable catches. B) Regional fisheries catch in relation 
to their MSY values over 150 years. MSY is indicated by a dotted line. C) Available biomass in the regional stocks, in relation to their pristine 
levels, and indication of the exploitation phases for each stock (I, Pre-development; II, Growth; III, Full exploitation; IV, Overexploitation; V, 
Collapse; VI, Recovery). Grey region indicates maximum sustainable yield obtained when the available biomass is nearly 50% of the carrying 
capacity. D) Global fisheries production in 150 years in relation to their potential maximum, which is achieved when the 10 fisheries are fully 
exploited. The maximum global production is thus related to the maximum potential productivity of marine ecosystems in stable conditions.
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same time as high demand levels. Similar simulations 
run with several iterations would reorder the sequence 
of collapse and then, as the sequence of fisheries enter-
ing their full exploitation phase follows a geographical 
pattern, those who remain longer at MSY levels will be 
those that collapse first. 
In the final scenario (Fig. 5), an adaptive regulation 
system is able to cope with synergies between markets 
and natural fluctuations in fish stock abundance. Every 
year, after the state of the resources is monitored, fish-
ing quotas are set so that stocks will be driven to BMSY 
levels. The development and growth phases are very 
similar to previous figures. In contrast, once the critical 
price-to-cost has been reached and the global fisheries 
have entered the full exploitation phase, regulators will 
impose a decrease in yearly catches if they are nega-
tively affected by a climatic fluctuation. Thus, stocks 
will recover to BMSY levels. If the environmental signal 
is positive, adaptive management will allow a yield 
larger than MSY. Once the critical price-to-cost ratio 
has been exceeded, the marine commodities price will 
be driven both by the constantly expanding demand and 
by climate-induced supply variability. At this full ex-
ploitation level, fleet fishing effort will remain at EMSY 
levels, set accordingly to the periodic climate-induced 
biomass variability and without further economic con-
siderations. After the world’s fisheries have reached 
their maximum capacity in the simulation, the global 
supply fluctuates around their maximum potential. 
The probability of exceeding the average maximum 
potential is determined by the mean of the normally 
distributed environmental function in the model. Note 
that a very strong assumption is considered here, i.e. 
that the knowledge of the system is perfect.
DISCUSSION
Our simulations suggest that the synergies between 
global markets and regional climate can potentially 
trigger a sequential overexploitation and collapse of 
the resources. However, from a theoretical point of 
view, this situation may be managed to secure global 
sustainability.
In recent decades technological developments have 
increased fisheries catches and allowed the exploitation 
of remote marine ecosystems. Our first 2 simulations 
consider that every fish population has the potential to 
produce a harvestable surplus and that the harvest that 
could be removed is determined by the MSY which can 
be estimated (Lackey, 2005). Management targets fol-
lowing this assumption are estimated to be potentially 
stable, e.g. where the sustainable yield and/or eco-
nomic revenue are maximized (Gordon, 1954; Lleonart 
and Merino, 2010). For both, fisheries development is 
triggered by economic profits (Sethi et al., 2010) and 
regulated following ecosystems’ capacity to replace the 
removed biomass. In our second simulation, the initial 
development phase of a fishery is characterized by a 
market interaction between producers and consumers, 
producing fluctuations in the system. However, once 
the demand is sufficiently high it encourages the full 
development of the fishery. When a critical price-to-
cost ratio is reached, producers tend towards MSY con-
ditions and not MEY (maximum economic yield) con-
ditions, even though the fishery is driven by economic 
incentives, which may seem contradictory to equilib-
rium solutions in classic bioeconomic models (Gordon, 
1954). This happens due to 2 particularities of our 
model: First, MSY and MEY targets assume constant 
market and environment conditions. In our first 2 simu-
lations (Figs. 2 and 3), the environment is considered 
to be stable, which validates the MSY capacities, but 
not the market, considered to be subject to a constant 
increase in demand and a market equilibrium. MSY 
and MEY tend to converge as the price-to-cost ratio 
increases (Gordon, 1954; Lleonart and Merino, 2010), 
which may be caused by price increases in concert with 
growing demand or cost reductions arising from tech-
nology, subsidies or other economic incentives (Clark 
et al., 2005). Second, in the model exploiters maximize 
not their sustainable economic yield but their short 
term economic return and, as demonstrated in Lleonart 
and Merino (2010), exploiters tend to exceed the MSY 
point. Maximizing short-term economic profit has 
been identified as another cause for the unsustainable 
exploitation of fisheries (Pauly et al., 2003; Clark et 
al., 2005; Lleonart and Merino, 2010).
Despite being commonly perceived as national or 
regional, fisheries have gone through similar sequential 
exploitation phases, which confirm that regional fisher-
ies are not isolated systems (Pauly et al., 2003; Watson 
et al., 2004; Berkes et al., 2006). In the network model 
proposed here, marine resources are not geographically 
isolated but part of a common resource in a globalized 
economic market (Oakerson, 1992). The consequence 
of globalization, as demonstrated through simulation, 
is the sequential exploitation, overexploitation and col-
lapse of the world’s fisheries. The synergies between 
climate change and economic globalization have been 
pointed out as being responsible for the sequential 
overexploitation of marine resources observed since 
the mid-20th century (O’Brien and Leichenko, 2000; 
Berkes et al., 2006). In our network, the demand for 
marine products provides an incentive for the develop-
ment of fisheries in a sequential pattern, with the clos-
est production systems being exploited first, and there-
after, when the demand is high enough farther ones are 
exploited too. In reality, the early development phases 
of global fisheries ended in the Northern Atlantic soon 
after second world war and in the rest of the world be-
tween 1960 and 1990 (Christensen et al., 2003; Garcia, 
2009; Sethi et al., 2010). 
Climate change and environmental oscillations can 
produce fluctuations in fisheries production at inter-
annual, decadal and inter-decadal scales (Chavez et al., 
2003; Barange and Perry, 2009). Fishing can amplify 
environmentally driven fluctuations, cause fish distri-
bution changes, alterations to fish age structure (Hsieh 
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et al., 2006; Anderson et al., 2008; Hsieh et al., 2009) 
and alterations to ecosystems (Pauly et al., 1998; Ess-
ington et al., 2006). Periods of variable price, driven 
by climate-induced fluctuations in small pelagic fisher-
ies supply, or by increases in fishmeal demand due to 
aquaculture expansion, have been observed in recent 
decades (Chavez et al., 2003; Merino et al., 2010b). 
In our model climate perturbations are introduced by 
a random yearly fluctuation. Stock variability is con-
siderably larger when stocks are fully exploited (phase 
II). There are alternative explanations to why fishing 
magnifies fluctuations in fish abundance (Anderson et 
al., 2008) and our model mimics this phenomena using 
a perturbation term that multiplies the stock’s surplus 
production or a logistic term, which is maximum when 
the stocks are close to their MSY levels. In contrast, 
our model considers that as stocks tend to carrying ca-
pacity or extinction, the variability tends to disappear. 
Another issue with the adopted assumption of random-
ness in variability is that the probability of a positive 
effect of the environment on the recruitment or other 
process is equal to that of negative ones. In practice, 
good environmental effects are more exceptional than 
bad ones, which seem to be more frequent for example 
for the Peruvian anchoveta recruitment in the Pacific 
(Chavez et al., 2003). Introducing this effect in our 
modelling framework would probably accelerate the 
collapse of fish stocks. 
The synergies between environmental and market 
drivers are managed in 2 alternative ways in our model. 
In Figure 4, the synergies are managed through a quota 
system based on the regionally estimated MSY. This 
management system seeks stable and maximum catch-
es. Our model assumes that the knowledge of the sys-
tem is complete, except for the environmental variabil-
ity, and that exploiters’ compliance is complete, which 
is far from being accurate (Mora et al., 2009). With 
this management system fisheries sequentially become 
overexploited and collapse. As discussed, these devel-
opments can create the illusion of global production 
being stable. FAO and other international databases 
report stagnated global catches of 95 Mt annually al-
though several important stocks have been depleted 
during the last 3 decades (Pauly et al., 2003). Similar 
compensations of declining and developing resources 
have been observed not only in real fisheries (Berkes 
et al., 2006; Scales et al., 2006) but also in some non-
renewable resources (Curtis, 2009). While the global 
collapse emerges here as a result of a theoretical simu-
lation, it has been predicted using real fisheries data 
(Worm et al., 2006), although those predictions were 
later rebutted by the same authors (Worm et al., 2009).
An additional consequence of the simulations under 
a stable MSY target management scheme is overinvest-
ment. In order to fulfil their assigned quotas, exploiters 
have economic incentives to invest in fishing effort, 
which in certain phases, for a high enough price-to-cost 
ratio, multiplies the estimated fishing capacity of de-
veloped fisheries by a factor of 5 in our simulation. Our 
results illustrate how world’s fisheries have been over-
capitalized following economic opportunities. Over-
capitalization is one of the causes of the state of world 
fisheries and an important issue for future international 
policies (Pauly et al., 2003; FAO, 2007; World Bank, 
2008; EU, 2009). 
Our simulations were run under the assumption of 
a constantly increasing demand for marine commodi-
ties (Delgado et al., 2003). In contrast, some authors 
demonstrate that prices of fish fell in the period 1950-
2002 (Sumaila et al., 2007). However, the price-to-cost 
ratio has increased due to other reasons, such as the 
development of fishing technology and subsidies. The 
development of new fisheries has been mediated by 
the establishment of new markets and their associated 
trade opportunities. Although our way to model the in-
creasing demand by a price function may be debatable, 
the effective price-to-cost ratio that explains profits 
and fisheries dynamics is accurate (Sethi et al., 2010). 
Another important factor that could modulate demand 
is substitution. Eventually, if a valid substitute is found 
for a marine commodity, as happens with the replace-
ment of fishmeal by soymeal, the demand for a marine 
commodity will presumably be reduced. The effect of 
substitution in fishmeal has been analyzed in empiri-
cal studies (Kristofersson and Andersson, 2004) and 
with theoretical models (Merino et al., 2010a; Briones, 
2006) and could be incorporated in the model used here 
in the future. 
All our simulations were run under the condition of 
constant catchability. However, technological develop-
ment and the increasing demand for marine products 
has encouraged fishing fleets to exploit increasingly 
remote resources (Pauly et al., 2002). While a techno-
logical development parameter was initially added to 
the model, it was eventually removed for the sake of 
simplicity, as it did not introduce significant changes in 
the results. However, increasing the price-to-cost ratio 
accounts for the effects of technological development, 
as it aims to reduce the cost of fishing in a similar way 
as it aims to increase fishing capacity. 
Our simulations are run with theoretical param-
eters. However, non-dimensional variables are shown 
in our figures. More accurate parameters would pro-
duce variations in the contribution of single stocks to 
global fisheries production and accelerate or decelerate 
their time in each exploitation phase. Moreover, only 
10 fish stocks are considered to represent world’s fish-
eries, which is a major simplification. Increasing the 
number of stocks simulated would make our analysis a 
bit fuzzier and would not provide a relevant clarifica-
tion to our discussion. 
The management based on a stable MSY criterion 
(Figs. 2, 3 and 4) implies ignoring the natural variabil-
ity affecting fish stocks even without fishing (Hilborn 
and Walters, 1992) and proved inefficient (Pauly et al., 
2002). Adaptive management has recently been pro-
moted as one of the factors that sustain the recovery 
of endangered fish stocks (Worm et al., 2009). In our 
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model, we have introduced an adaptive management 
scheme that sets quotas periodically using yearly fish 
stock assessments. In the simulation shown in Fig. 
5, adaptive management measures were effective in 
avoiding the risk of collapse of fully exploited stocks, 
even when they were negatively affected by envi-
ronmental conditions. In contrast, when a favourable 
climatic cycle occurs, catch is allowed to exceed the 
estimated MSY, so the extra ecosystem productivity 
was optimized. Fully developed fisheries would fluc-
tuate largely driven by climate and additional fishing 
effects. Fishing effort would fluctuate accordingly, 
similarly to what in practice happens when abundance 
cycles modulate fleet activity and production in an-
nual, inter-annual and inter-decadal scales following 
well-known environmental events in upwelling and 
cascading regions (Chavez et al., 2003; Company et 
al., 2008; Maynou, 2008). In this simulation, global 
fisheries fluctuate within the limits of the ecosystem’s 
maximum production potential. Adaptive manage-
ment, under the assumption of full knowledge of the 
system’s dynamics and compete compliance, would 
lead to the optimum use of marine ecosystems.
In practice, the majority of managed fisheries aim 
to apply adaptive management, but their knowledge 
of the system is not perfect as we considered in our 
simulations. Current management aims at harvesting at 
a rate likely to lead to MSY, resulting in lower catches 
when biomass is low for any reason, including natural 
or human. Inefficient management causes collapses due 
to a combination of reasons, including poor knowledge 
of stock status, undermining the potential negative ef-
fects of uncertain environmental drivers, and the aim 
of maintaining high catches (Larkin, 1977). Another 
cause of collapse is the delayed response to scientific 
assessments, as happened in the Bay of Biscay an-
chovy recently (De Oliveira et al., 2005). In contrast, 
some fisheries show a significant reactivity to signals 
of a potential environmental impact on fish stocks, as 
happens with the anchoveta fishery off Peru, where 
the national fishery is completely closed 2 days after 
El Niño signals have been detected (Arias-Screiber et 
al., 2010). As stated in the introduction, we designed 
a simplistic, highly inefficient management scenario 
that was compared to a perfect adaptive management 
one. None can be assigned to reality but our results 
suggest the need to increase our knowledge in order 
to provide better periodic stock assessments, to reduce 
the uncertainty of climate impacts on fish stocks, and 
to adapt flexible fishing industries to dynamic ecosys-
tem opportunities. Furthermore, our results indicate 
that economic globalization allows our fisheries to be 
understood as a common issue, which should therefore 
be managed following international agreements.
In conclusion, this work suggests that the combina-
tion of global rising demand for marine products and 
regional climate-induced variability requires a global 
and adaptive perspective. It will help to optimize and 
protect the services obtained from marine ecosystems. 
This work also suggests the need for further research 
aimed at reducing uncertainty about climate impacts 
on fisheries in order to assess the courses of action 
to enhance the sustainable use of marine resources. 
Adaptive management, in addition to the ecosystem 
and precautionary approaches, can improve the global 
ecosystem’s performance (Cury et al., 2008; Worm et 
al., 2009). 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work is a contribution to the QUEST-FISH 
project, which aims to investigate how climate change 
would affect the potential production of global fisher-
ies resources in the future. Some of the ideas presented 
originated in a EurOceans course “Economic versus 
ecological networks - integrating economy and ecol-
ogy in scenario building for marine ecosystems. An 
advanced course in economic and ecological modelling 
drawing on the theory of network economics”, Sète, 
France, November 2009. 
REFERENCES
Anderson, C.N.K., C.-H. Hsieh, S.A. Sandin, R. Hewitt, A. Hol-
lowed, J. Beddington, R.M. May and G. Sugihara. – 2008. Why 
fishing magnifies fluctuations in fish abundance. Nature, 452: 
835-839.
Arias-Screiber, M., M. Ñiquen and M. Bouchou. – 2010. Adapting 
to climate change – lessons from the Peruvian anchovy fishery 
on how to cope with extreme climatic events and environmental 
variability. Effects of Climate Change on Fish and Fisheries: 
Forecasting Impacts, Assessing Ecosystem Responses, and 
Evaluating Management Strategies. 26-29th April 2010, Sendai, 
Japan.
Arnason, R. – 2006. Global warming, small pelagic fisheries and 
risk. In: Hanneson R., M. Barange and S.J. Herrick (eds.), Cli-
mate change and the economics of the world’s fisheries. Edwar 
Elgar Publishing Limited, pp. 1-32. Cheltenham (UK).
Barange, M. and R.I. Perry. – 2009. Physical and ecological impacts 
of climate change relevant to marine and inland capture fisher-
ies and aquaculture. FAO Fisheries Technical Reports.
Behrenfeld, M.J., R.T. O’Malley, D.A. Siegel, C.R. McClain, J.L. 
Sarmiento, G.C. Feldman, A.J. Milligan, P.G. Falkowski, R.M. 
Letelier and E.S. Boss. – 2006. Climate-driven trends in con-
temporary ocean productivity. Nature, 444: 752-755.
Berkes, F., T.P. Hughes, R.S. Steneck, J.A. Wilson, D.R. Bellwood, 
B. Crona, C. Folke, L.H. Gunderson, H.M. Leslie, J. Norberg, 
M. Nystrom, P. Olsson, H. Osterblom, M. Scheffer and B. 
Worm. – 2006. Globalization, roving bandits, and marine re-
sources. Science, 311: 1557-1558.
Brander, K. – 2007. Global fish production and climate change. 
PNAS 104:19709-19714.
Briones, R. M. – 2006. Projecting future fish supplies using stock 
dynamics and demand. Fish Fish., 7(4): 303-315.
Chavez, F.P., J. Ryan, S.E. Lluch-Cota and C.M. Niquen. – 2003. 
From anchovies to sardines and back: multidecadal change in 
the Pacific ocean. Science, 299: 217-221.
Cheung, W.W.L., V.W.Y. Lam, J.L. Sarmiento, K. Kearney, R. 
Watson and D. Pauly. – 2009. Projecting global marine bio-
diversity impacts under climate change scenarios. Fish Fish., 
10(3): 235-251. 
Christensen, V., S. Guénette, J.J. Heymans, C.J. Walters, R. Watson, 
D. Zeller and D. Pauly. – 2003. Hundred-year decline of North 
Atlantic predatory fishes. Fish Fish., 4: 1-24.
Clark, C.W., G. Munro and U.R. Sumaila. – 2005. Subsidies, buy-
backs and sustainable fisheries. J. Environ. Econ. Manage., 50: 
47-58.
Company, J.B., P. Puig, F. Sardá, A. Palanques and M. Latasa. – 
790 • G. MERINO et al.
SCI. MAR., 75(4), December 2011, 779-790. ISSN 0214-8358 doi: 10.3989/scimar.2011.75n4779
2008. Climate influence on deep sea populations. PLoS ONE. 
p. e1431.
Curtis, F. – 2009. Peak globalization: Climate change, oil depletion 
and global trade. Ecolog. Econ., 69(2): 427-434. 
Cury, P.M., Y.–J. Shin, B. Planque, J.M. Durant, J.M. Fromentin, 
S. Kramer-Schadt, Stenseth, M. Travers and V. Grimm. – 2008. 
Ecosystem oceanography for global change fisheries. Trends 
Ecol. Evol., 23: 338-346.
Delgado, C.L., N. Wada, M.W. Rosegrant, S. Meijer and M. 
Ahmed. – 2003. Fish to 2020: Supply and demand in changing 
global markets, Washington, D.C. (US) and Penang (Malaysia), 
226 pp.
De Oliveira, J.A.A., A. Uriarte and B.A. Roel. – 2005. Potential 
improvements in the management of Bay of Biscay anchovy by 
incorporating environmental indices as recruitment predictors. 
Fish. Res., 75: 2-14.
Essington, T.E., A.H. Beaudreau and J. Wiedenmann. – 2006. Fish-
ing through marine food webs. PNAS., 103: 3171-3175.
EU. – 2009. Green Paper. Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy 
by the Commission of the European Communities.
FAO. – 2007. The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, Rome.
Garcia, S.M. – 2009. Rising to depletion? Towards a dialogue on the 
state of national marine fisheries. World Bank, Washington DC.
Gordon, H.S. – 1954. The economic theory of a common-property 
resource: the fishery. J. Polit. Economy, 62: 124-142.
Hilborn, R. and C.J. Walters. – 1992. Quantitative fisheries stock 
assessment: choice, dynamics and uncertainty. Chapman and 
Hall, New York, 570 pp.
Hoggarth, D.D., S. Abeyasekera, R. Arthur, J. Beddington, R.W. 
Burn, A.S. Halls, G.P. Kirkwood, M. McAllister, P. Medley, 
C.C. Mees, G.B. Parkes, G. Pilling, R.C. Wakeford and R.L. 
Welcomme. – 2006. Stock assessment for fishery management. 
A framework guide to the stock assessment tools of the Fisher-
ies Management Science Programme, RomeHsieh, C.-H., S.C. 
Reiss, J.R. Hunter, J.R. Beddington, R.M. May and G. Sugi-
hara. – 2006. Fishing elevates variability in the abundance of 
exploited species. Nature, 443: 859-862.
Kirby, M.X. – 2004. Fishing down the coast: historical expansion 
and collapse of oyster fisheries along continental margins. 
PNAS, 101: 13096-13099.
Hsieh, C.-H., H.J. Kim, W. Watson, E. Di Lorenzo and G. Sugihara. 
– 2009. Climate driven changes in abundance and distribution 
of larvae of oceanic fishes in the southern California region. 
Glob. Change Biol., 15: 237-2152.
Kristofersson, D. and J.L. Anderson. – 2004. Structural breaks in the 
fishmeal-soybean meal price relationship. In: Discussion papers 
of the Norwegian University of Life Sciences. 
Lackey, R.T. – 2005. Fisheries: history, science, and management. 
In: Lehr J.H., Keeley J. (eds.) Water Encyclopedia: Surface and 
Agricultural Water, pp. 121-129. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 
Publishers, New York.
Larkin, P.A. – 1977. An epitaph for the concept of maximum sus-
tainable yield. Trans. Am. Fish. Soc., 106: 1-11.
Lleonart, J. and G. Merino. – 2010. Immediate maximum economic 
yield; a realistic fisheries economic reference point. ICES J. 
Mar. Sci., 67: 577-582.
Maynou, F. – 2008. Environmental causes of the fluctuations of red 
shrimp (Aristeus antennatus) landings in the Catalan Sea. J. 
Mar. Syst., 71: 294-302.
Merino, G., F. Maynou and A. Garcia-Olivares. – 2007. Effort 
dynamics in a fisheries bioeconomic model: A vessel level ap-
proach through Game Theory. Sci. Mar., 71: 537-550.
Merino, G., M. Barange and C. Mullon. – 2010a. Climate variability 
and change scenarios for a marine commodity: Modelling small 
pelagic fish, fisheries and fishmeal in a globalized market. J. 
Mar. Syst., 81: 196-205.
Merino, G., M. Barange, C. Mullon and L. Rodwell. – 2010b. 
Impacts of global environmental change and aquaculture ex-
pansion on marine ecosystems. Global Environ. Change., 20: 
586-596.
Mora, C., R.A. Myers, M. Coll, S. Libralato, T.J. Pitcher, U.R. Su-
maila, D. Zeller, R. Watson, K.J. Gaston and B. Worm. – 2009. 
Management effectiveness of the World’s marine fisheries. 
PLoS Biology, 7:e1000131.
Mullon, C., J.F. Mittaine, O. Thébaud, G. Péron, G. Merino and 
M. Barange. – 2009. Modeling the global fishmeal and fish oil 
markets. Natural Res. Modeling, 22: 564-609.
Nagurney, A. – 1993. Network economics. A variational inequality 
approach. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
O’Brien, K.L. and R. M. Leichenko. – 2000. Double exposure: 
assessing the impacts of climate change within the context of 
economic globalization. Global Environ. Change, 10: 221-232.
Oakerson, R.J. – 1992. Analyzing the commons: A framework. In: 
Bromley D.W. (ed.), Making the commons work: Theory, prac-
tice and policy, pp. 41-59. ICS Press, San Franciso, California.
Orensanz, J.M., J. Armstrong, D. Armstrong and R. Hilborn. – 
1998. Crustacean resources are vulnerable to serial depletion 
-the multifaceted decline of crab and shrimp fisheries in the 
Greater Gulf of Alaska. Rev. Fish Biol. Fish., 8: 117-176.
Pauly, D., V. Christensen, J. Dalsgaard, R. Froese and Jr. F. Torres. 
– 1998. Fishing Down Marine Food Webs. Science, 279: 
860-863.
Pauly, D., V. Christensen, S. Guénette, T.J. Pitcher, U.R. Sumaila, 
C.J. Walters, R. Watson and D. Zeller. – 2002. Towards sustain-
ability in world fisheries. Nature, 418: 689-695.
Pinnegar, J.K., D. Viner, D. Hadley, S. Dye, M. Harris, F. Berkout 
and M. Simpson. – 2006. Alternative future scenarios for ma-
rine ecosystems. Cefas, Lowestoft.
Pauly, D., J. Alder, E. Bennett, V. Christensen, P. Tyedmers and 
R. Watson. – 2003. The future for fisheries. Science, 302: 
1359-1361.
Scales, H., A. Balmford, M. Liu, Y. Sadovy and A. Manica. – 2006. 
Keeping Bandits at Bay? Science, 313: 612-614.
Schaefer, M. – 1954. Some aspects of the dynamics of populations 
important to the management of the commercial Marine fisher-
ies. Bull. Inter-Am. Trop. Tuna Comm., 1: 27-56.
Seijo, J.C., O. Defeo and S. Salas. – 1998. Fisheries bioeconomics. 
Theory, modelling and management. FAO technical papers, 
368. Rome, 108 pp.
Sethi, S.A., T.A. Branch and R. Watson. – 2010. Fishery develop-
ment patterns are driven by profit but not trophic level. PNAS, 
107: 12163-12167.
Sumaila, U.R., A. Marsden, R. Watson and D. Pauly. – 2007. A 
Global Ex-vessel Fish Price Database: Construction and Ap-
plications. J. Bioecon., 9: 39-51.
Watson, R and D. Pauly. – 2001. Systematic distortions in world 
fisheries catch trends. Nature., 414: 534-536.
Watson, R., A. Kitchingman, A. Gelchu and D. Pauly. – 2004. 
Mapping global fisheries: sharpening our focus. Fish Fish., 5: 
168-177.
World Bank. – 2008. The Sunken Billions. The economic justifica-
tion for fisheries reform, Rome.
Worm, B., E.B. Barbier, N. Beaumont, J.E. Duffy, C. Folke, B.S. 
Halpern, J.B.C. Jackson, H.K. Lotze, F. Micheli, S.R. Palumbi, 
E. Sala, K.A. Selkoe, J.J. Stachowicz and R. Watson. – 2006. 
Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services. 
Science, 314: 787-790.
Worm, B., R. Hilborn, J.K. Baum, T.A. Branch, J.S. Collie, C. Cos-
tello, M.J. Fogarty, E.A. Fulton, J.A. Hutchings, S. Jennings, 
O.P. Jensen, H.K. Lotze, P.M. Mace, T.R. McClanahan, C. 
Minto, S.R. Palumbi, A.M. Parma, D. Ricard, A.A. Rosenberg, 
R. Watson and D. Zeller. – 2009. Rebuilding Global Fisheries. 
Science, 325: 578-585.
Zeller, D. and D. Pauly. – 2005. Good news, bad news: global fish-
eries discards are declining, but so are total catches. Fish Fish., 
6: 156-159.
Scient. ed.: F. Maynou.
Received November 10, 2010. Accepted April 4, 2011.
Published online October 12, 2011.
